Switzerland, with an area of approximately 41,000 square kilometres, is a small and beautiful country, even smaller than Nepal’s Karnali and Sudurpashchim provinces. This landlocked nation comprises a federal government, 26 cantons, and around 22 hundred local municipalities.
While there is ongoing debate in Nepal about federalism being costly in a small country with limited resources, Switzerland has been practising exemplary federalism for 177 years.
The renowned Swiss legal scholar, Professor Eva Maria Belser, is based in the picturesque city of Fribourg, Switzerland. She has served as the Head of the Department of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the University of Fribourg and currently holds the position of Co-Director of the Institute of Federalism.
Her expertise primarily lies in Swiss and comparative federalism, constitutional law, and human rights.
Recently, Onlinekhabar conducted an interview with Professor Eva Maria Belser on Swiss federalism and the experiences of other countries.
Compared to a unitary system, federalism is often described as a costly arrangement. How has Switzerland, whose size is roughly comparable to Nepal’s Karnali Province, been practising federalism for around 177 years?
Many countries that adopt federalism or are in the process of federalization are concerned about costs. At the beginning, there is a fear that adding more layers of government and administrative structures will increase expenses and reduce efficiency.
According to Switzerland’s experience, federalism can be highly efficient and can even help with resource mobilization. The main reason is that positions and staff are organized according to responsibilities and tasks.
For example, if local government is responsible for primary education, then the relevant staff will work there. But at the canton level (similar to provinces in Nepal), no one works in primary education, and the same applies to the federal administration. The Swiss federal administration is relatively small—smaller even than the administration of a large canton.
For countries like Nepal, which have a history of unitary governance, this is difficult, because the central government and administration are usually very large. When federalism is introduced and provincial administrations are created, the central administration must be downsized.
You cannot simply keep the central administration as it is and then add more positions at the lower levels. Sometimes we forget that decentralization is not only about provinces; it is also about the center. Many people working in the central administration need to move to their respective provinces and join the provincial administration. This is a major challenge.
Many federal governments cannot implement federalism fully. Most governments prefer to keep structures as they are. This is unfortunate, because federal governments should recognize that they can work in a very different and more interesting way. They do not manage schools, buildings, or rooftops in detail. Instead, they handle planning, monitoring, setting standards, and international relations—and they operate with fewer staff.
How does Switzerland manage the expenses for the services and facilities of federal to local representatives? Mainly, how do you manage the burden of providing facilities for a large number of legislators and executive representatives?
An interesting aspect of Switzerland’s system is that politicians are not full-timers. We call this the “militia system.” Especially at the local and cantonal levels, politicians remain active in their own professions.
They may be farmers, nurses, lawyers, teachers, or social workers,professionally engaged while also involved in politics.
These politicians do receive a salary, but it is very modest, since they are still active in their main occupations. This practice prevents them from clinging to political office as their only career; instead, they have the freedom to return to their farm, hospital, or workplace. Politics is not pursued as a way to earn major financial benefits.
This system has another advantage: people primarily motivated by the prospect of high income are not drawn into political structures. Rather, the political system attracts individuals who genuinely want to serve their community. Many elected representatives carry out their duties in the evenings, sometimes devoting only about 20 percent of their time, considering it more a civic duty and a public service.
Many small local governments also operate with this spirit of service. No one is forced to participate against their will. For example, my mother was never obliged, but she served as the chair of the school commission in our village while being a housewife.
She was involved in teacher recruitment and did not receive a salary. Her personal commitment came from the fact that her children were studying at that school. This kind of dedication has made our system financially sustainable.
If legislators and executive representatives hold both roles simultaneously, there is likely a significant risk of conflicts of interest. How do the Swiss state manage such complexities?
In the case of those engaged in judicial work, such roles are not acceptable. They must remain independent and free from any economic interests. But in parliament, this issue is not particularly objectionable, since citizens naturally have their own preferences and interests. In a parliamentary system, the presence of political, economic, and social issues is normal. In a democracy, when people choose their representatives, they do so based on their knowledge and experience.
Of course, citizens have their own interests. Farmers may support farmer-friendly agendas, while industrialists may support industry-friendly policies. Members of parliament, too, may support interests related to their sector or profession.
If a broader economic interest is involved, this is not considered problematic, because a broader economic interest is not a matter of personal gain.
However, if a legislator has a purely personal stake or private interest in a matter, they cannot participate in the process. If the issue concerns only their own benefit, then they must refrain. But when larger trade or professional interests are at stake, they may bring their expertise and contribute to the law-making process.
There are arguments that federalism soon becomes a burden for small nations like Nepal. How then did Switzerland remain an exception for more than one and a half centuries?
Many Swiss citizens raise similar questions. It is natural to ask, “Aren’t we too small for 26 national units and more than 2,000 local governments?” There have even been repeated attempts to merge cantons. Some people argue that seven cantons would be enough for Switzerland instead of 26, but that idea has never succeeded in practice.
When we try to measure people’s regional and local identity, the local and regional identity of Fribourg (a small, historic city between Geneva and the capital, Bern) appears to be the most significant. People tend to feel more “at home” in their own city or village, even if it is small.
Switzerland has adopted a strategy of merging villages and local governments. In some places, this has indeed increased efficiency. However, where decision-making authority rests with the local government, such demands are often rejected.
From my personal experience, this is not a major problem. One of our PhD students studied small local governments in the Alpine regions of Switzerland, Italy, and Austria. She conducted many interviews with local officials. Those local governments said that although they may be too small to manage schools, waste collection, and minor security arrangements on their own, they still enjoy the freedom to cooperate with whichever partners (other local municipalities) they choose.
Sometimes we cooperate with one neighboring municipality on education matters, while for waste collection we collaborate with another nearby village. We have options, and we also retain some discussion and decision-making power. If the partners do not perform according to our expectations, we can change them. In this way, all services are delivered through close partnerships.
In Switzerland, there is the federal government, 26 cantons, and about 2,200 local governments, each with its own legal system. Doesn’t such a federal structure create complexity, confusion, and burdens?
I am happy to hear such questions, because Swiss citizens raise the same ones. Most Swiss people find it extremely complex. We are a small country, and there are so many levels and structures that no one can have a complete overview. Personally, I like diversity, I believe in local democracy, and I have an interest in the system.
In fact, it is not that complicated. Families live in the same city or village. They know the rules of their village, school, and education system. They also contribute to making the laws and regulations there. The neighboring city may have different rules. But why should that create confusion? You live here, and you get the laws and rules according to your needs.
When federal, provincial, and local governments work simultaneously, overlapping powers can arise. Switzerland, which practices cooperative federalism, did it faced such challenges, or did it gradually reach its present system?
Federal systems are usually dynamic and evolve. This makes it easier to learn and adapt.
In most countries with a federal system, monetary policy remains at the central level. In this system, there are cases where the authority that first responds or enacts laws and policies ends up setting the national policy. This is also a feature of the Swiss system.
Sometimes, new challenges may arise in a country—climate change, immigration, new forms of crime, threats to individual freedoms, or digital issues. The most alert canton can immediately formulate policies and enforce laws. Sometimes these are not perfect, and other cantons observe, learn, adapt, and improve. After a certain period, it becomes appropriate to implement minimum standards at the national level.
In this way, there is an ongoing process of dialogue, information exchange, feedback, and learning both horizontally among cantons and vertically across levels. Sometimes there are conflicts, but to be honest, even within individual units, conflicts do arise.
Federal practices always emerge from their own historical and contextual backgrounds, which determine the structure, form, and functioning of federalism in each country. So, federal practices cannot be identical across nations, can they?
Certainly. Power relations matter a lot, and context is extremely important, the economic context, the political context, and the historical background of a country. In addition, the role and perspectives of neighboring countries also have an impact. All of these shape your federal system. That is why every country has its own form and originality of federalism.
However, when I study comparative federalism, I am often surprised that the same questions and challenges arise. Take your question, for example, in my country, journalists would ask the very same ones: “Isn’t this too expensive? Isn’t it inefficient? Doesn’t it overburden citizens and enterprises?”
Surprisingly, different countries have to deal with very similar challenges. Of course, the circumstances differ. Our 26 cantons are permanently established, and their identity is strong. In Nepal, the provinces are relatively new. They are artificial structures that still need to be consolidated. This clearly brings a major difference in the pattern.
Having practiced federalism for more than one and a half centuries, Switzerland calls its governance system a unique example of direct democracy. But can’t countries with a unitary system also uphold the highest standards of democracy? Why then is federalism regarded as a distinct form of democracy in comparison?
According to assessment, federal states, regional states, or unitary states can all reach the highest level of democracy—there is no doubt about that. But I would say that a federal system can add further depth to democracy, because it does not function only at the national level.
In particular, in countries with ethnic diversity, there is a risk of permanent winners and permanent losers. If your ethnic or linguistic community makes up only 20 or 10 percent of the population, there is a risk of always being on the losing side. This may discourage you from valuing democracy.
However, if democracy is practiced at different levels, such groups can be told: even if you are not always in the majority at the national level, you can still be the majority in your own province or region. In that way, you can build your own smaller democracy.
If you are responsible for matters related to your culture, language, or religion, you will feel much more comfortable in this country. Thus, when different communities and democratic spaces interact and overlap within the same country, the democratic system gains special depth and stability.
When disputes and conflicts between levels of government remain unresolved, the Supreme Court delivers a verdict with a judicial opinion. What principles does Switzerland’s Supreme Court base its judgments in such cases?
This is an important difference between our two countries. Even back in the 1940s and 1950s of the last century, there was consensus in Switzerland on what the essence of the system was. If it had to be expressed as a slogan, the answer would have been: “We have to talk together. We have to engage in dialogue with one another. Let’s talk.”
Switzerland’s federal system does not depend on judicial dispute resolution. Sometimes I see this as a problem. Occasionally, the constitution can provide a clear answer to the question, “Who is following the rules and who is violating them?” But in most cases, I prefer the idea of dialogue and mediation.
Federalism is often described as a partnership, a contract, a treaty where the parties interact on an equal level. The cantons are not small sub-national units subordinate to the central government. In some ways, it is similar to international law. There is a lot of pride, respect, and emotion involved.
You stand for your province and canton, and you do not want to lose. If you lose in court, it requires enormous pressure to implement the agenda, because a strong federal unit has lost, and forcing implementation is difficult.
That is why we prefer arrangements that are not legally perfect but mutually agreed upon. Both sides say, “All right, let’s do it this way. I am not fully satisfied, but I can accept it.” Then both return home and implement it. No force is needed. Seen in this light, I appreciate the system.
I do not know how disputes in Nepal can be settled and an agenda established, because the central authority is strong and federalism is still new. For provinces, it is very difficult to say, “We are partners, let’s sit at the same table.” Unfortunately, history and other contexts sometimes suggest that violence appears to be the best way to bring parties to the negotiating table.
Societies that have gone through many conflicts often try to center dispute resolution in the judicial system, where a winner–loser mindset emerges. For federal partners, that channel is not always comfortable.
We have gained a decade of experience with federal governance in Nepal. The central government has been reluctant to delegate authority to the lower levels, while the local governments have been relatively effective. However, the provincial governments have not been able to perform effectively during this period. There have even been occasional calls for their dissolution. Have other countries also had similar experiences ?
I remember when I first met Nepal’s federalism experts more than ten years ago, back when constitutional debates were still ongoing in Nepal. I asked them, “Why are you creating provinces? What role will the provinces have? Are you sure provinces are necessary?”
It is not predetermined that provinces are mandatory in a federal system. I can compare Nepal with South Africa, where they speak of having an “hourglass federalism.”
There is a strong center and strong local governments. You may know that a few years ago, the African National Congress even said, “Let’s remove the provinces.” Their argument was that provinces do not contribute to the system and are expensive.
I understand that such debates are happening in Nepal. In South Africa, however, that debate has already ended. In Nepal, for now, one can still say, “No, we can give the provinces a role,” but it takes time for them to develop.
For example, issues of economic development cannot be designed at the national level alone. Some provinces may want to focus on agricultural development, while others may focus on tourism, and they have a better understanding of their own region. Local governments cannot handle this on their own either, because regional planning is necessary.
Therefore, the role of provinces is still evolving, but it takes much more time than expected, especially when provinces are artificial new units, as they take time to establish themselves. Just as in South Africa, the Northern Cape or the Western Cape were units that did not exist before.
For this reason, it will take time for an emotional connection with provinces, like in Nepal, to develop. If at some point the national and local governments agree to make the federal system work well between them, then a two-tier federalism (dual federalism) could be created. There is nothing to prevent that.
